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ARTICLES
UNDER CONTAINMENT: PREEMPTING STATE EBOLA
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS
Eang L. Ngov *
The outbreak of Ebola in Africa and its recent emergence in America has
brought to light that the ambit of state sovereignty in the face of federal policy is
unsettled in the public health field. Quarantine laws have historically been
recognized as an exercise of state police powers and, absent discriminatory uses,
courts have afforded much deference to states when the federal government is
dormant.
This Article explores federalism implications when federal and state
sovereigns contest the purview of regulating Ebola, other epidemics, and
quarantines. This Article examines how the federal government could assert
supremacy to regulate the treatment of epidemics and quarantine through
preemption, in light of traditionally recognized state police powers over health and
safety, and evaluates the value of federal and state sovereignty over such matters. It
argues that the anti-preemption clause of the Public Health Service Act, which

* Associate Professor, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law. J.D., University of
California at Berkeley School of Law; B.A., University of Florida. For Jade. I am indebted to Donna
Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig, Seema Mohapatra, Karin Moore, Daniel P. O’Gorman, Mark A.
Rothstein, and Alan Untereiner for their insightful comments. I am grateful for excellent research
assistance and editing provided by Mary Arias, Gracie Gamez, Christopher Joseph, Brittany Sonnier,
Jesse Stern, and Kristen Trucco; help from law reference librarians Diana Botluk and Louis Rosen;
assistance from PC Support Specialist Owen Gregory; support from Faculty Assistant Fran Ruhl; and
financial support through the Barry University School of Law Summer Research Grant.
I thank the editors and journal members at Temple Law Review for their meticulous and
thorough edits and other assistance in the publication of this Article.
This Article was presented at the American Constitution Society’s First Annual Constitutional
Law Scholars Forum hosted by the Barry Student Chapter on March 20, 2015, and at the Loyola
University Chicago Sixth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium on November 7, 2015.

1

2

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

governs federal authority over quarantines and communicable diseases, and the
Supreme Court’s general presumption against preemption would not save state
quarantine regulations from preemption. It concludes that preemption doctrines,
particularly obstacle and field preemption, could override state quarantine
regulations because state law arguably threatens national security by frustrating
federal efforts to contain Ebola in West Africa and impeding the Executive’s
exercise of his foreign affairs power.
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INTRODUCTION
emerged 1

on U.S. soil when the Centers for Disease Control and
Ebola
Prevention (CDC) confirmed on September 30, 2014 that Thomas Eric Duncan
was the first person to be diagnosed with Ebola in the United States. 2 Ebola is a

1. Ebola first arrived in the United States in 1989, when laboratory monkeys tested positive for
Ebola. Paul E. Kilgore, John D. Grabenstein, Abdulbaset M. Salim & Michael Ryabak, Treatment of
Ebola Virus Disease, 35 PHARMACOTHERAPY: J. HUM. PHARMACOLOGY & DRUG THERAPY 43, 44
(2015); Alison Bruzek, Ebola in the United States: What Happened When, NPR (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/10/15/356098903/ebola-in-the-united-states-what-happenedwhen. For a history of the Ebola virus and outbreaks, see Georgina Casey, Ebola—The Facts, KAI
TIAKI NURSING NEW ZEALAND, Dec. 2014 –Jan. 2015, at 20, 20–21.
2. Cases of Ebola Diagnosed in the United States, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-imported-case.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2015). Before Duncan, there were patients who contracted Ebola and were flown to the
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hemorrhagic fever 3 with a high mortality rate, particularly in Third World
countries. 4 While West Africa struggled to control the quickly rising death toll
caused by the virus, 5 fears in America 6 mounted when two nurses who cared for
Duncan 7 and aid workers returning from Africa were diagnosed with Ebola. 8
In reaction to the Ebola cases, states began to devise quarantine measures.
Quarantine 9 refers to separation of individuals who have been exposed to an
infection, but who are not sick, from those who have not been exposed. 10
Quarantine, by definition, focuses on persons showing no symptoms of
infection. 11 Isolation, on the other hand, involves separating infected persons
from the noninfected population. 12 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
announced plans to implement a mandatory twenty-one-day quarantine on all
persons arriving in the United States who had contact with anyone infected with
Ebola. 13 The twenty-one-day quarantine period related to Ebola’s incubation
period of two to twenty-one days. 14 Florida, 15 New Jersey, and Illinois followed

United States to receive treatment. See Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly
Virus, ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ebola-americatimeline/story?id=26159719.
3. See Ebola, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ebola/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
4. The CDC reports that “[t]he 2014 Ebola epidemic is the largest in history, affecting multiple
countries in West Africa.” 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). As
of October 7, 2015, there were 28,465 total cases (suspected, probable, and confirmed) of Ebola,
resulting in 11,312 deaths. Id.
5. See Lupkin, supra note 2.
6. Media Matters released a report tracking the number of Ebola-related stories, finding that
“CNN ran 146 stories on Ebola the week of October 14, when panic was peaking.” Jonathan Cohn,
Why Public Silence Greets Government Success, AM. PROSPECT (May 8, 2015),
http://prospect.org/article/why-public-silence-greets-government-success.
7. See JAMES JAY CARAFANO, CHARLOTTE FLORANCE & DANIEL J. KANIEWSKI, HERITAGE
FOUND., THE EBOLA OUTBREAK OF 2013–2014: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ACTIONS 4 (2015),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/SR166.pdf (“Duncan’s entrance into the United States
and the infection of two of his nurses galvanized public fears of Ebola.”).
8. See Lupkin, supra note 2.
9. For a history of quarantine, see Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical
Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 229–34 (2015) [hereinafter
Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola].
10.
Quarantine
and
Isolation,
CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Bruzek, supra note 1.
14. Thomas W. Geisbert & Peter B. Jahrling, Towards a Vaccine Against Ebola Virus, 2
EXPERT REV. VACCINES 777, 777 (2003).
About 95 per cent of cases fall within this incubation period but 98 per cent of cases fall
with[in] an incubation period of one to 42 days, hence the World Health Organisation’s
requirement of 42 days Ebola-free to declare an outbreak contained. Mean incubation times
in the west Africa outbreak appear to be nine to 11 days.
Casey, supra note 1, at 23 (footnote omitted).
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suit. 16 Louisiana banned attendance to the annual American Society of Tropical
Medicine and Hygiene meeting for all researchers who visited West Africa
within a three-week span from the meeting, 17 threatening a twenty-one-day
mandatory hotel room quarantine for any noncomplying attendees. 18 In total,
twenty-one states imposed mandatory quarantines. 19
The CDC 20 formulated guidelines for monitoring symptoms 21 and
controlling movement based on the level of risk posed by persons exposed to
Ebola. 22 These guidelines were less stringent than state guidelines and did not
recommend mandatory quarantine for noncontagious, asymptomatic
individuals. 23 The controversy surrounding mandatory Ebola quarantines lies in
the fact that asymptomatic persons are not contagious 24 because Ebola is not
airborne but is contracted through contact with bodily fluids, 25 infected animals,
15. Matt Flegenheimer, Michael D. Shear & Michael Barbaro, Under Pressure, Cuomo Says
Ebola
Quarantines
Can
Be Spent
at
Home, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/nyregion/ebola-quarantine.html?_r=0.
16. Bruzek, supra note 1. Connecticut also joined those states and imposed a quarantine on
travelers returning from West Africa. Evan Lips, Yale Grad Student Says Ebola Quarantine Driven by
Politics, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/generalnews/20141028/yale-grad-student-says-ebola-quarantine-driven-by-politics.
17. Bruzek, supra note 1. Ironically, this meeting would have been relevant for infectious
disease researchers. The New York Times reports,
Dr. Alan J. Magill, the president of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene,
said the move by Louisiana to block doctors who had treated Ebola patients from its
conference this weekend would harm crucial sessions where scientists, doctors and
administrators who had been in the region were going to teach others.
Jess Bidgood & Kate Zernike, From Governors, a Mix of Hard-Line Acts and Conciliation over Ebola,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/us/kaci-hickox-nurse-under-ebolaquarantine-takes-bike-ride-defying-maine-officials.html?_r=0.
18. Bruzek, supra note 1.
19. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 255.
20. The CDC’s responsibilities include the prevention of “international and interstate spread of
diseases.” Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2015,
at 5, 5 [hereinafter Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law]. It operates twenty quarantine stations
and assists states with “technical assistance, research, guidance, laboratory services, data collection,
and other support.” Id.
21. Ebola symptoms can initially include “high fever, chills, malaise[,] and myalgia,” but
“prostration, anorexia, vomiting, nausea, abdominal pain, diarrhea, shortness of breath, sore throat,
edema, confusion[,] and coma” can later develop. Geisbert & Jahrling, supra note 14, at 777.
22. Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to
Stop
the
Spread
of
Ebola,
CTRS.
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/monitoring-symptoms-controlling-movement.pdf (last visited Nov. 1,
2015); see also Betsy McKay, Collen McCain Nelson & Stephanie Armour, CDC Rejects Mandatory
Ebola Quarantines, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-ebolaquarantine-guidelines-released-by-cdc-1414443143.
23. McKay et al., supra note 22.
24. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations (Oct. 14, 2014), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20141016/
102718/HHRG-113-IF02-20141016-SD002.pdf.
25. Professor Mark Rothstein explains that the risk of infection does not result merely from
contact with any bodily fluid, but
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or contaminated objects. 26
The federal authority to impose quarantines is specified in 42 U.S.C. § 264,
the section of the Public Health Service Act that governs quarantines and
communicable diseases. 27 The Act gives
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread
of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United
States and within the United States and its territories/possessions. . . .
Under its delegated authority, CDC, through the Division of Global
Migration and Quarantine, is empowered to detain, medically examine,
or conditionally release persons suspected of carrying a communicable
disease. 28
President Ronald Regan, by Executive Order 12,452, added Ebola and
other hemorrhagic fevers to the list of diseases over which federal quarantine
could be imposed. 29 The CDC rarely uses its quarantine powers but instead
defers to state and local health authorities. 30 The interplay between the
Commerce Clause’s grant of federal authority to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce 31 and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of police powers to the
states 32 has resulted in placing the control of diseases within state borders with
state and local governments, and the control of disease abroad and among the

[i]n fact, contact must be with the highly infectious bodily fluid (i.e., vomit, diarrhea, or
blood) of a seriously ill patient. . . . [T]here is no evidence of anyone becoming infected with
Ebola in this epidemic without direct contact with the bodily fluid of an individual whose
condition has progressed at least to the gastrointestinal phase of the illness. This phase
occurs between three and ten days after the onset of symptoms.
Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 259.
26. Transmission, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/transmission/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2015); Radio Interview by KOGO News Radio with
Kristi Koenig, Professor of Emergency Med., U.C. Irvine Sch. of Med. (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.kogo.com/onair/afternoon-news-55377/kristi-koenig-on-ebola-12920492/.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
28. Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/sars/quarantine/qa-isolation.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2015).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,452, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,927 (Dec. 22, 1983).
30. Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 28
(“In general, HHS defers to state and local health authorities in the primary use of their separate
quarantine powers. Based on long experience and collaborative working relationships with our state
and local partners, CDC anticipates that the need to use this federal authority to actually quarantine a
person will occur only in rare situations, such as in events at ports of entry or other time-sensitive
settings.”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also
Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Police power is unquestionably an area of
traditional state control.”).
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states with the federal government. 33
Following Governor Cuomo’s announcement, the White House conceded
that it had “limit[ed] . . . power” to enforce the CDC guidelines against the
states, 34 and tension with the White House ensued as presidential aids sought to
persuade states to reconsider their mandatory bans. 35 Governor Chris Christie
later modified New Jersey’s mandatory quarantine requirement to allow Kaci
Hickox, a nurse who had contact with Ebola-infected persons through her
voluntary aid work in Africa, 36 to spend the remainder of the quarantine period
in her home. 37 Contrary to numerous news media reports, 38 Governor Christie
denied insinuations that his actions were the result of pressure from the White
House. 39
These events bring to the forefront an important question: Who should
regulate quarantines? Further, what if Governor Christie had not relented?
Recent scholarship on Ebola has focused on the civil rights of those affected by
quarantine, 40 particularly liberty and due process interests, all of which are
important inquiries. But the issue of proper allocation of power between the
states and the federal government to regulate Ebola quarantine has received
little attention.
This Article explores whether federal standards could preempt state Ebola
regulations. There are political concerns that the federal government might
consider in deciding whether it wants federal law to preempt state law. 41 This
Article does not suggest that such political constraints should be disregarded or
that preemption can be achieved easily, but rather, the purpose of the Article is
to provide legal arguments for preemption, if the federal government chooses to

33. James J. Misrahi, Joseph A. Foster, Frederic E. Shaw & Martin S. Cetron, HHS/CDC Legal
Response to SARS Outbreak, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 353, 353 (2004).
34. McKay et al., supra note 22. Ironically, the media reported that Governor Cuomo “cast
decisions on screening procedures as ‘a federal issue.’” Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.
35. Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.
36. See Rosa Prince, U.S. Nurse Who Threatened to Sue over Ebola Quarantine to Be Freed,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 27, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ebola/
11190337/US-nurse-who-threatened-to-sue-over-Ebola-quarantine-to-be-freed.html.
37. Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, State Quarantine Powers Under the Constitution:
Fear in the Age of Ebola, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/statequarantine-powers-under-the-constitution-fear-in-an-age-of-ebola. Kaci Hickox spent the first three
days of her quarantine “in a tent on hospital grounds.” Id.
38. E.g., Prince, supra note 36 (reporting that “amid suggestions that the White House also
opposed the quarantining of health workers who did not have symptoms, for fear it would put others
off volunteering, Mr[.] Christie changed tack”).
39. Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.
40. For an excellent discussion of the liberty interest and ethical concerns raised by Ebola
quarantine, see Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9.
41. Preemption is also applicable to local government regulations. See, e.g., Wis. Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991) (deciding whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act preempted a town’s regulation of pesticide use). The term “state law” is used
throughout this Article to encompass the constitutions, regulations, rules, and ordinances of states,
municipalities, etc.
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pursue that strategy. Additionally, a discussion of what quarantine measures are
appropriate and how they can be implemented is beyond the scope of this
Article. This Article does not presuppose that implementation of quarantines is
efficacious or advisable 42 but aims to resolve the legal quandary over Ebola
quarantines—how may the federal government regulate Ebola within state
borders? While this Article focuses on Ebola quarantine regulations, the thrust
of it is also applicable to state quarantine regulations over other illnesses, such as
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 43 and the like.
This Article begins, in Section I, by briefly connecting the relationship
among federalism, preemption, and supremacy to quarantine regulations.
Section I also defines the types of preemption: express, obstacle, impossibility,
and field preemption. Preemption allows federal law to trump state laws in a
number of ways. A state law can conflict with federal law by making it
impossible to meet both federal and state laws, which is known as impossibility
preemption, or by impeding a federal objective, which is known as obstacle
preemption. When this occurs, conflict preemption allows the federal law to
override state law. A state law can also be displaced when it intrudes into a field
exclusively reserved for the federal government or where there is a dominant
federal interest. In these circumstances, field preemption also ousts state law.
As discussed in Sections II and III respectively, the states’ two strongest
arguments against federal displacement rest on their traditional police powers,
particularly in the areas of health and safety, and the anti-preemption clause in
the Federal Public Health Service Act. 44 Although the Federal Act contains an
anti-preemption clause that declines to preempt state law, the Supreme Court
has previously allowed federal law to preempt other types of state law even in
the face of anti-preemption clauses. 45
It is uncontested that quarantine laws fall within state police powers to

42. Public health experts, such as Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig, and Fuh-Yuan Shih, have
noted that quarantines are difficult to implement and enforce. They have observed,
While backed by legal authority, the public and even the health care worker community’s
understanding of the term is murky at best and scientific evidence to support the use of
quarantine is frequently lacking. The multiple interpretations and references to quarantine,
the inconsistent application of public health quarantine laws across jurisdictional boundaries,
and reports of ineffectiveness, are further complicated by associated infringement of civil
liberties and human rights abuses.
Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig & Fuh-Yuan Shih, Is There a Case for Quarantine? Perspectives
from SARS to Ebola, DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS, Mar. 2015, at 1, 1. For a
public response to mandatory quarantines, see Robert J. Blendon, Catherine M. DesRoches, Martin S.
Cetron, John M. Benson, Theodore Meinhardt & William Pollard, Attitudes Toward the Use of
Quarantine in a Public Health Emergency in Four Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar. 2006, at W15,
W16 (surveying residents of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States on their concerns
regarding compulsory quarantine).
43. In 2003, President George W. Bush signed an executive order that allowed quarantining
persons with SARS and other contagious diseases, but not the flu. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed.
Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.cdc.gov/sars/quarantine/exec-2004-04-03.html.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2012).
45. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of anti-preemption clauses.
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regulate health, safety, and welfare. 46 The Court generally operates with a
presumption against preemption when federal law touches on traditional state
powers. 47 However, even in traditional areas of state power, the Court has found
preemption of state laws. Thus, neither the presumption against preemption,
invoked when the federal law implicates state police powers, nor the antipreemption clause would necessarily safeguard state Ebola quarantine
regulations from preemption.
This Article argues, in Sections IV and V respectively, that state Ebola
quarantine regulations can be preempted under obstacle preemption and field
preemption doctrines. Obstacle preemption allows for the overriding of state
laws when they impede a federal objective. 48 The federal government could
employ obstacle preemption to argue that state Ebola quarantine laws impede
the federal government’s desire for uniform approaches to Ebola, national
security via domestic efforts to contain Ebola, and federal commitment to
combat Ebola abroad. 49 State quarantine regulations frustrate federal efforts to
contain Ebola in West Africa because they decrease the amount of healthcare
workers available by discouraging volunteers and making travel impossible while
under quarantine. Consequently, the inability to contain Ebola in West Africa
threatens national security.
Field preemption is concerned with state laws that intrude on an area of
exclusive federal domain and can invalidate state law if states regulate in an area
where there is a pervasive federal scheme or a dominant federal interest. 50 At
least one species of field preemption is applicable to preempt state Ebola
regulations. Although it is unlikely that the Federal Public Health Service Act
has sufficient breadth to support field preemption based on a pervasive federal
scheme, state Ebola regulations could be preempted because of a dominant
federal purpose. The dominant federal purposes are national security and
control over foreign affairs, which would be affected by the spread of Ebola in
the United States and abroad. Relatedly, the President’s independent foreign
affairs power could also support preempting state Ebola quarantine laws. Thus,

46. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380,
387 (1902) (“That from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce quarantine laws for
the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has been recognized by Congress, is
beyond question.”).
47. See infra Section II.
48. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the different types of preemption.
49. Of course, the viability of these arguments depends on whether there is sufficient leadership
from the Executive for a court to discern the federal objective. Public health experts have noted the
failure of the CDC and the President to provide clear guidance regarding Ebola. At first, the CDC did
not recommend quarantining persons who had contact with patients before the patients became
infectious. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola, supra note 9, at 256. Later, the CDC revised its policy to
recommend all health workers who traveled to West Africa—even those who were asymptomatic—to
undergo “direct active monitoring.” Id. at 257. Professor Rothstein observes, “The CDC’s revision of
its guidance, however, by following more aggressive state policies, may have increased doubts about
the adequacy of CDC’s initial recommendations, thereby seeming to confirm the wisdom of the
expanded quarantine measures imposed by some state governments.” Id. at 260–61.
50. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of field and obstacle preemption.

2015]

UNDER CONTAINMENT

9

federal preemption of state Ebola quarantine laws would protect the United
States as well as countries abroad.
I.
A.

FRAMING THE QUARANTINE ISSUE

The Intersection of Federalism, Supremacy, and Preemption

“Today’s legal debates about federalism, as it applies to issues of health and
safety . . . are often debates about statutory preemption.” 51 Federalism involves
determining the proper allocation of power between the federal and state
governments 52 and encompasses the recognition that “both the National and
State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to
respect.” 53 Federalism includes the balance of Congress’s exercise of its powers,
as granted in Article I of the Constitution, with the reservation of power to the
states, as articulated in the Tenth Amendment. 54
At times, maintaining that balance necessitates the utilization of
preemption, one mechanism of distributing power between the federal and state
governments. 55 Preemption commands that state law yield in the face of
conflicting federal law 56 and owes its origins to the Supremacy Clause, 57 the
source of congressional power to preempt 58 state law. 59 Preemption functions by

51. Robert R. M. Verchick & Nina A. Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism 1
(Univ. of Michigan Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 98,
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030597.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
55. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 405 (4th ed.
2011) (“Ultimately, preemption doctrines are about allocating governing authority between the
federal and state governments.”).
56. The Court has used the terms “conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance;
difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference” to describe some
of its considerations in determining the validity of state laws in light of federal law. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
58. Scholars use different terminology to describe overruling existing state law. Professor
Stephen Gardbaum uses “preemption” while Professor Thomas Merrill uses “displacement”; this
Article uses the terms interchangeably. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 727, 730–31 (2008).
59. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. The Court itself has recognized that preemption derives from
the Supremacy Clause. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“[U]nder the
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly
within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”
(quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988))); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“The pre-emption doctrine . . . has its roots in the Supremacy Clause . . . .”).
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overriding existing valid state law. As will be discussed later in greater detail,
some instances of preemption void the particular state law at issue, leaving other
nonconflicting state law in tact; in other instances, preemption results in banning
states from regulating in an entire area of law.
B.

Values of Federalism

Whether preemption should be applied rests on a value judgment about the
benefits of federalism: (1) protection against federal tyranny, (2) states’ ability to
tailor policies reflecting local concerns, and (3) states as laboratories. 60 The
following provides a brief discussion of these benefits, but an exhaustive
exploration is beyond the scope of this Article.
The first justification for protecting state sovereignty is that it is a bulwark
against federal tyranny. This justification depends on the vertical separation of
powers between the levels of government as a means to “avoid the undue
concentration of power in the federal government and preserve essential
individual liberties.” 61 But “there has been a major shift over time as to how
abusive government is best controlled. . . . Judicial review is seen as an important
check against tyrannical government actions.” 62
Yet, some scholars observe that the Court’s recent use of preemption has
hampered civil rights and protection of individuals. 63 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
criticizes the Court’s preemption jurisprudence as “wrong in invalidating
desirable state and local laws creating liability for injured consumers, protecting

Some scholars, however, argue that the Supremacy Clause is not the proper source of authority to
support preemption doctrines. Professor Gardbaum theorizes that preemption should be grounded in
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 782. He points out that there are
distinctions between preemption and supremacy, and that “[s]upremacy does not presuppose
preemption.” Id. at 769. Supremacy and preemption involve circumstances when state and federal
governments share concurrent power. Id. at 770. Professor Gardbaum delineates the different roles of
supremacy and preemption: supremacy regulates concurrency by allowing for state and federal laws to
coexist and elevating federal law when a conflict occurs, while preemption ends state powers
completely. Id. at 771. As he posits, supremacy arises when valid federal law overrides conflicting valid
state laws, but because states have power to legislate in the area, they may amend their laws to avoid
the conflict. Id. at 770–71. On the other hand, preemption removes a state’s power to legislate in the
area, which in effect obviates the need to resolve the conflict between valid state and federal law. Id. at
771. Thus, according to Professor Gardbaum, supremacy involves a case-by-case analysis and cannot
eliminate state legislative powers over an entire field. Id. at 772–73. Consequently, Professor
Gardbaum argues that preemption is a greater power, not derived from supremacy—a lesser power.
Id. at 774.
Other scholars argue that the Supremacy Clause is the source of authority for some types of
preemption. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of
the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829 (1992).
60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 320–22; Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson,
Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY
OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 13, 16–17 (William L. Buzbee ed., 2009).
61. Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 16.
62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 321.
63. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2004).
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children from tobacco advertisements, and requiring insurance companies to
disclose their Holocaust-era policies.” 64
On the other hand, some scholars find that preemption can lead to
beneficial results for the people. 65 Professor Hiroshi Motomura shows the value
of preemption as an alternative method of vindicating individual rights,
particularly in discrimination cases, when the pursuit of other principles like
equal protection have not been fruitful. 66 He observes, “Given the obstacles to
equal protection claims by unauthorized migrants, preemption has become the
challenge of choice, and thus the focus of judicial opinions.” 67 The value of
preemption, as Professor Motomura points out, is that it “avoids serious
constitutional questions about the efficacy of arguments based on an individual
right like equal protection by enabling an institutional competence argument,
which in turn forces government decisionmaking into a federal forum that makes
a constitutionally doubtful statute less likely.” 68 Granted, a victory founded on a
preemption argument may sidestep pronouncing a moral judgment, 69 thereby
failing to vindicate a litigant’s moral sensibilities, but such preemption victories
establish boundaries that states must respect.
The second argument in favor of preserving state authority to regulate is
that states are closer to the people and can better devise policies that address
local concerns. 70 “[O]ne of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political
structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives
are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns,
government is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully
realized.” 71 But, of course, empowering government can lead to “pernicious
objectives.” 72
A third benefit of federalism is that states may function as laboratories to
“try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” 73 But “[t]he key question is when is it worth experimenting, and when
is experimentation to be rejected because of a need to impose a national

64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1736 (2010) (suggesting that many challengers of immigration laws now
use preemption arguments as an alternative to equal protection claims).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1745.
69. See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 99 (1985) (“prefer[ring] an equal protection approach . . .
because it answers, in a way that preemption reasoning does not, the moral and philosophical claims
that resident aliens make against their state governments”).
70. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 321; Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 16–17.
71. Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 1324 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995)).
72. Id. at 1333.
73. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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mandate?” 74 Relatedly, state-centered approaches might lead to negative
externalities that harm people out of state. 75
Ultimately, federalism should be justified on the basis of the people.
“States’ rights are not an end in themselves. They are a means to the crucial
objectives of advancing freedom and enriching the lives of those in the United
States.” 76 Thus, it should not be presumed that state sovereignty best effectuates
the values underlying federalism. Preemption might be the more effective
vehicle in the case of Ebola. Generally, those who support state sovereignty and
individual rights would argue against preempting state law. In the case of Ebola,
however, preempting state quarantine laws would advance individual rights, such
as those of Kaci Hickox and others subjected to mandatory quarantine.
C.

Types of Preemption

In addition to consideration of the value of federalism, the other
consideration in applying preemption 77 rests on a determination of congressional
intent to exclude state regulation, for, as the Court has stated, congressional
intent is the “ultimate touchstone.” 78 The most explicit manifestation of
congressional intent is express preemption, by which Congress, through the text
of legislation, withdraws specified powers from the states. 79 When a statute lacks
an express preemption clause, congressional intent to prohibit state intrusion can
also be inferred through two forms of implied preemption: field or conflict
preemption. 80
Field preemption results when states legislate in a field over which Congress
has exclusive governance. 81 Field preemption exists when federal legislation in a
particular area is so extensive and “pervasive” as to signal the federal
government’s implied intent to occupy the field and exclude states from
legislating in that field. 82 The Court has described field preemption as involving

74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 322.
75. Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 60, at 18.
76. Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 1316.
77. For a history of the development of preemption doctrines, see Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 972–1005 (2002); Patricia L. Donze,
Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints Through Restrictions on Preemption
Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 246–49 (2000–2001); Gardbaum, supra note 58, at
785–807.
78. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2531 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
79. Id. at 2500–01 (majority opinion); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.
88, 98 (1992) (describing the types of preemption).
80. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Professor Gardbaum argues that the term “conflict
preemption” is contradictory because when a valid state law yields to federal law, it is not due to
preemption but to supremacy. Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 809.
81. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.
82. Id. (“The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of
regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
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federal legislation that is intended to be a “single integrated and all-embracing
system,” 83 “complete scheme,” 84 “harmonious whole,” 85 or “comprehensive and
unified system.” 86 A dominant federal interest in a field might also lead to an
assumption that Congress intended to exclude state legislation in the area. 87
Conflict preemption occurs when the laws are mutually exclusive, in other
words, when it is “physical[ly] impossib[le]” to comply with federal and state
law. 88 Another form of conflict preemption is obstacle preemption, which
overrides a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 89 The Court has, in
some instances, treated obstacle preemption as a subset of conflict preemption, 90

of state laws on the same subject.’” (omissions in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
83. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941)).
84. Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67).
85. Id. at 2502 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72).
86. Id.
87. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Hines, 312 U.S. at 70.
88. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
89. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Obstacle preemption is
controversial. First, the problem in attacking a state law under obstacle preemption lies in the
difficulty of ascertaining the “full purposes and objectives” of federal law. Caleb Nelson, Preemption,
86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000). Because each member of Congress has her own reason(s) for passing
legislation and the process of lawmaking entails compromises, it is difficult to attribute a collective
purpose to a federal statute. Id. at 280.
Second, scholars have argued that obstacle preemption conflicts with a textual approach. Justice
Thomas criticizes the Court’s use of obstacle preemption for straying from the federal statute’s text.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Note,
Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (2013) (arguing that implied
preemption conflicts with a textualist approach). Consistent with a textual approach, Professor S.
Candice Hoke recommends that preemption be circumscribed to include only situations of conflict
between state and federal actions. Hoke, supra note 59, at 886. Professor John Ohlendorf, however,
questions the assumption that obstacle preemption and textualism are irreconcilable. John David
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 373 (2013). Professor Daniel
Meltzer offers another defense of obstacle preemption, arguing that it is too “difficult[] and
burden[some]” for Congress to write laws directly addressing preemption issues, as Congress would
need to be familiar with the endless number of state and local laws and foresee how federal legislation
would impact them. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343,
377.
Finally, Professor Caleb Nelson points out that obstacle preemption can result in unnecessary
invalidation of state laws: “The mere fact that Congress enacts a statute to serve certain purposes,
then, does not automatically imply that Congress wants to displace all state law that gets in the way of
those purposes.” Nelson, supra, at 281. Professor Susan Raeker-Jordan also contends that obstacle
preemption undercuts the presumption against preemption because a frustration of federal objectives
can be easily found. Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (1998). Similarly, describing the Court’s
general preemption practice as overzealous, Professor Patricia Donze fears the Court’s use of
preemption when Congress truly did not intend to displace state law. Donze, supra note 77, at 255.
90. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (referring to conflict preemption as including “cases
‘where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ and . . . instances
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but state laws that impede a federal objective can be preempted even if state and
federal laws are not mutually exclusive. 91
The categories at times overlap, 92 and their application has not always been
clear. 93 The confusion is worsened by the Justices’ disagreement as to what type
of preemption arises in a given situation. For example, Justice Blackmun
suggested that “field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption,” explaining that a state’s legislation in a particular field can conflict
with congressional intent to preclude state legislation. 94 Justice O’Connor later
subscribed to the same view in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n,
a case that engendered a different debate about the distinctions between express
and implied preemption. 95 In Gade, however, Justice Kennedy contended that
the case raised an express preemption issue, rather than implied preemption. 96
Additionally, in another case, Justice Souter acknowledged an unsettled question
as to whether field or conflict preemption should be applied to the executive
where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress” (quoting Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 143; then quoting Hines, 312
U.S. at 67))).
91. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 404.
92. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992) (noting that
preemption categories are not “rigidly distinct” (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5
(1990))).
The boundaries between the types of preemption may become blurrier as Congress begins to
meld implied preemption with express preemption provisions. In one particular statute, Congress has
written obstacle preemption into its legislation: “[A] requirement of a State, political subdivision of a
State, or Indian tribe is preempted if . . . the requirement of the State, political subdivision, or tribe, as
applied or enforced, is an obstacle to accomplishing and carrying out this chapter, a regulation
prescribed under this chapter . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a)(2) (2012); see also Nelson, supra note 89, at
279 (quoting legislation); Note, supra note 89, at 1076 (referring to statute).
93. Scholars alike have described the Court’s preemption jurisprudence as a “muddle,” “chaos,”
an “awful mess,” and “wildly confused.” Nelson, supra note 89, at 232–33 (collecting scholarly
criticisms of the Court’s treatment of the preemption doctrines); see Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign
Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178 (“The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence is
famous for its incoherence.”). Professor Hoke has remarked,
One searches the Court’s preemption cases in vain to uncover a unitary structure for
preemption analysis; indeed, inconsistency persists even among the opinions authored by
any single Justice. Scholars and commentators on various preemption issues also vary their
inventory of preemption types or categories and fail to agree on their interrelation.
S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 733
(1991) (footnotes omitted). Professor Ernest Young explains that the Court’s diverging approaches
result from “the fact that any overarching framework of preemption principles must be applied to
interpret a range of quite diverse statutory regimes, including many in which courts must share
interpretive duties with federal agencies.” Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 255 [hereinafter
Young, The Ordinary Diet of the Law].
94. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. at 79 n.5 (1990). Professor Nelson suggests that field and conflict
preemption should not be confined to the subset of implied preemption, but that both types of
preemption may arise in the context of an express statement or by implication. Nelson, supra note 89,
at 263.
95. 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992).
96. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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foreign relations power. 97 Ultimately, the Court has noted the lack of “an
infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick” and
resolved that “[i]n the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula.” 98
This Article seeks to apply these preemption doctrines to state quarantine
regulations, but as a result of the preemption categories’ fluidity, the analysis
discussed in one section of this Article may also be applicable to other sections.
II.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION

One shield that states could deploy to protect their quarantine regulations is
the presumption against preemption. The Court has devised a presumption
against preemption, 99 based on the fact that
because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in
those in which Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” 100
The presumption against preemption has been applied in a number of
contexts: (1) as only a mere “assumption that Congress did not intend to displace
state law,” 101 (2) when federal acts touch only “historic police powers of the
State[],” 102 or (3) when accompanied with a requirement of a statement
indicating Congress’s clear and manifest purpose. 103

97. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 398 (2003) (discussing the appropriate label for
the type of preemption in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)).
98. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
99. Some scholars question the presumption against preemption. Professor Nelson, for example,
offers a theory that the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante provision, and as such, it undermines the
presumption against preemption. Nelson, supra note 89, at 232. He explains that non obstante clauses
have been used to obviate the need to harmonize a new law with prior ones by allowing the new law to
displace any prior contradictory law. Id. Thus, the natural operation of the Supremacy Clause’s non
obstante provision rebuts the need for a residual presumption against the invalidation of state laws. Id.
at 293. For different reasons, Professor Jack Goldsmith advocates for abandoning the presumption
against preemption, as well as the presumption in favor of foreign affairs. Goldsmith, supra note 93, at
177. Professor Viet D. Dinh argues that when Congress legislates within its enumerated power, no
presumption for or against preemption should be applied. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092 (2000).
100. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); then quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1985)).
101. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
102. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
103. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). For an explanation about the differences
between the presumption against preemption and the clear statement rule, see Young, The Ordinary
Diet of the Law, supra note 93, at 271–72.
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States could argue that Ebola quarantine regulations are strictly within their
purview because health and safety are established areas of traditional state
power, 104 and consequently, the presumption against preemption should apply.
Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health is one of the earliest
Supreme Court cases to review quarantine regulations. 105 The case’s central
issue involved the constitutionality of the fee New Orleans imposed for each
vessel passing a quarantine station. 106 The Court upheld the fee against
allegations that the fee was in fact a tonnage tax, a tax prohibited by the
Constitution. 107 In so doing, it recognized quarantine as a police power. 108 In
another case, Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board
of Health, the Court upheld, on the basis of state police powers, a quarantine
resolution that prohibited vessels from landing in parishes under quarantine. 109
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, by upholding state compulsory smallpox
vaccination laws, the Court also affirmed state police powers to regulate health
and safety: “According to settled principles the police power of a State must be
held to embrace, at least such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.” 110
Thus, that quarantine regulation falls within state police powers is not
controversial.
All these cases, however, acknowledged the ability of the federal
government to displace state quarantine laws. In the Morgan’s Louisiana case,
the Court stated,
[F]or while it may be a police power in the sense that all provisions for
health, comfort, and security of the citizens are police regulations, and
an exercise of the police power, even where such powers are so
exercised as to come within the domain of federal authority as defined
in the constitution, the latter must prevail. 111
In Compagnie Francaise, the Court recognized that “quarantine laws belong to
that class of state legislation which . . . [is] valid until displaced . . . by
Congress.” 112 Similarly, the Jacobson Court conceded, “A local enactment or
regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a State, must
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the General Government of
any power it possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that
instrument gives or secures.” 113 A state might argue that these statements merely

104. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled principles the
police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
105. 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
106. Morgan’s S.S., 118 U.S. at 455.
107. Id. at 461–63.
108. Id. at 464.
109. 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).
110. 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
111. Morgan’s S.S., 118 U.S. at 464.
112. Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 389.
113. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.
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reflect the principle embodied in the Supremacy Clause and that, without more,
the states’ exercise of police powers to regulate Ebola quarantine should be
presumed not preempted.
But the presumption against preemption, as some scholars observe, has
been whittled down, so much so as to transform the presumption into one in
favor of preemption. 114 Professor Susan Raeker-Jordan describes the courts’
approaches to preemption as “free-wheeling” and undermining the presumption
against preemption by allowing “relatively easy” displacement of state law. 115
Similarly, Professor Mary Davis concludes the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence has shown a trend away from preserving state authority to
respecting federal authority and the need for uniformity. 116 Additionally, some
members of the Court have argued that a presumption against preemption is
entirely unnecessary when the federal law at issue contains an express
preemption clause. 117
The Court’s move in the direction of a presumption in favor of preemption
is evident from its decisions in family law cases. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, in
examining a Washington state statute where “designation of a spouse as the
beneficiary of a nonprobate asset [wa]s revoked automatically upon divorce,” 118
the Court acknowledged that family and probate law are areas of traditional
state powers. 119 Notwithstanding that acknowledgement, the Court invalidated
the law as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA): “[W]e have not hesitated to find state family law pre-empted when it
conflicts with ERISA or relates to ERISA plans.” 120 Similarly, the long history
of state community property laws did not shield state laws from obstacle
preemption in Boggs v. Boggs. 121 Likewise, that a state regulation concerned
family law did not prevent its preemption in McCarty v. McCarty, 122 Ridgway v.

114. For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); and American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)
indicate that the Supreme Court maintains a presumption in favor of preemption. Chemerinsky, supra
note 63, at 1318–24.
115. Raeker-Jordan, supra note 89, at 1468.
116. Davis, supra note 77, at 1013.
117. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, rejected the
majority’s conclusion “that express pre-emption provisions must be construed narrowly, ‘in light of the
presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations,’” and suggested that the Court
apply ordinary rules of statutory construction to the express provision. 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito have also taken this view. Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the
Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2010).
118. 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001).
119. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151.
120. Id. at 151–52.
121. 520 U.S. 833, 840–41 (1997).
122. 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (preempting the state court’s division of military nondisability retired
pay as community property in a divorce proceeding).
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Ridgway, 123 or Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. 124
Property law is another traditional area of state power that is not immune to
preemption. In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, property
owners challenged the due-on-sale provision in a trust deed held by a federally
chartered savings and loan association. 125 The Court conceded that “real
property law is a matter of special concern to the States,” but asserted that “[t]he
relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a
conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided
that the federal law must prevail.” 126 Accordingly, the Court found the state’s
due-on-sale law preempted on the basis of obstacle preemption. 127
Even in the state’s traditional field of health and safety, the Court has found
preemption, despite any presumption against preemption. In Gade, the Court
recognized a state’s “compelling interest” to protect health and safety and to
regulate licensing and professions. 128 But it reiterated “any state law, however
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary
to federal law, must yield [to federal law],” and invalidated the state’s regulation
of the training, testing, and licensing of hazardous waste workers. 129
The Court has insisted on a showing of “clear and substantial” federal
interests before preempting laws within traditional state powers, but the Court,
“even in th[ose] area[s], has not hesitated to protect, under the Supremacy
Clause, rights and expectancies established by federal law against the operation
of state law, or to prevent the frustration and erosion of the congressional policy
embodied in the federal rights.” 130 Thus, to preserve their Ebola quarantine
regulations, states should not rest solely on the presumption against preemption
but must be prepared to defend against the various forms of preemption.
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
Usually, federal law containing preemption provisions can pose a serious
threat to state laws because congressional intent to supersede state law is
unambiguous. Because express preemption is obvious from its text, it obviates
any controversy in determining whether preemption exists but shifts the focus to

123. 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (holding that the Federal Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act
precluded application of constructive trust against the insurance proceeds).
124. 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (invalidating the state court’s division of community property and its
award of the husband’s expected retirement benefits to his wife in a divorce proceeding, pursuant to
the Federal Railroad Retirement Act).
125. 458 U.S. 141, 148–49 (1982) (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978)).
126. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962)).
127. Id. at 156.
128. 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
129. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108–09 (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
130. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
572, 581 (1979)).
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determining the scope of the preemption. 131
In the present situation, the relevant federal statute, the Public Health
Service Act, does not contain an express preemption clause, 132 and, therefore,
states need not fear this form of preemption. Better yet, states could make use of
the Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause. 133 Anti-preemption
clauses are an express declination to override state law. Relatedly, saving
clauses, provisions within a statute that contain express intent to leave some
aspect of state law intact, function like anti-preemption clauses. Because the
Court has sometimes used these terms interchangeably, 134 both types of clauses
will be analyzed.
A.

Anti-Preemption Clauses

States might argue that the anti-preemption clause of the Federal Public
Health Service Act affords them protection against preemption and ensures that
states may regulate quarantines. Section 264 of the Public Health Service Act,
regulating quarantine and communicable diseases, contains the following antipreemption clause:
Nothing in this section or section 266 of this title, or the regulations
promulgated under such sections, may be construed as superseding any
provision under State law (including regulations and including
provisions established by political subdivisions of States), except to the
extent that such a provision conflicts with an exercise of Federal
authority under this section or section 266 of this title. 135
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co. is one example of an
131. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (“In these cases, our task is to
identify the domain expressly pre-empted . . . .”).
For examples of instances in which the Supreme Court found express preemption of state laws,
see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), in which the Court found state tort claims
preempted through the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;
Engine Manufacturers v. South Coast Air Quality Management, 541 U.S. 246 (2004), in which the Court
concluded that the Federal Clean Air Act preempted state motor vehicle pollution standards;
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), in which the Court held that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted a state law regulating point-of-sale and
outdoor advertising of cigarettes; Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000), in
which the Court determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempted a wrongful death claim
alleging that a railroad failed to maintain adequate warning devices at its crossings; and Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), in which the Court concluded that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act preempted state law tort and contract claims for breach of contract,
retaliatory discharge, and wrongful termination of disability benefits.
For an example of a circumstance in which the Court upheld a state law against an express
preemption challenge, see California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997), in which the Court found that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act did not preempt California’s wage law.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
133. Id. § 264(e).
134. See infra note 141 for a discussion of the interchangeable use of the terms “anti-preemption
clause” and “saving clause.”
135. 42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (emphasis added).
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effective congressional disclaimer against preempting state law. 136 Granite Rock,
a company that held unpatented mining claims on federally owned land in
California, challenged California’s permit requirement for mining within the
state. 137 Granite Rock relied upon the following provision of the Federal Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA):
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed—
(1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or
rights in the field of planning, development, or control of water
resources, submerged lands, or navigable waters; nor to displace,
supersede, limit, or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction or
responsibility of any legally established joint or common agency of two
or more states or of two or more states and the Federal Government;
nor to limit the authority of Congress to authorize and fund projects
. . . . 138
The legislative history of the CZMA included the Senate report revealing
the CZMA’s purpose: “There is no attempt to diminish state authority through
federal preemption. The intent of this legislation [the CZMA] is to enhance state
authority by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and
regulatory powers over their coastal zones.” 139 The Court concluded that the
CZMA did not preempt state permit requirements because of the CZMA’s
legislative history and language. 140
State Ebola regulations are still vulnerable because the Court has not
hesitated to overrule state law, even in the face of an anti-preemption clause. For
example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which regulates insurance, contains an
express anti-preemption clause: “No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .” 141
Whether a state law is preempted hinges on an important qualifier—“relates
to”—in the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s anti-preemption clause 142: “[A] federal
statute will not pre-empt a state statute enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance’—unless the federal statute ‘specifically relates to the

136. 480 U.S. 572, 592 (1987). Another example of a state’s successful assertion of an antipreemption provision can be found in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
746 (1985).
137. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 576–77.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1) (2012).
139. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 592 (quoting S. REP. 92-753, at 1 (1972)).
140. Id. at 593.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). Courts have used the term “anti-preemption” clause
interchangeably with the term “saving clause” to identify this provision of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996) (referring to the provision
as an anti-preemption rule); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 746 (referring to the provision as a saving
clause).
142. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 38.
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business of insurance.’” 143 In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the
issue arose out of the tension between a federal law authorizing national banks
to sell insurance and a state law prohibiting such banks to sell insurance. 144 The
anti-preemption clause was not applied to protect state law in Barnett Bank
because the federal authorization to sell insurance specifically related to the
business of insurance. 145
As Barnett Bank and Granite Rock demonstrate, whether states would
prevail in asserting the Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause to
prevent displacement of state quarantine laws depends on an examination of the
Act’s language and legislative history. A search of section 264 of the Public
Health Service Act’s legislative history yields no statement similar to that in
Granite Rock that sheds light on the anti-preemption clause. Textually, the
Public Health Service Act’s anti-preemption clause does not safeguard against
all preemption; it allows for preemption if state legislation conflicts with the
Federal Act. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether state quarantine
regulations conflict with federal law.
B.

Saving Clauses

If the provision in the Public Health Service Act is construed as a saving
clause, it might still preserve state law. 146 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick provides
an example of an effective saving clause. 147 In that case, the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act encompassed a saving clause, which provided that
“[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this
subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law.” 148 That saving clause protected state regulation from preemption because
the Court found that states were free to regulate aspects of vehicle performance,
such as stopping distances and vehicle stability that were not covered by federal
regulation. 149
In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, however, a saving clause provided
limited relief from preemption. 150 In that case, Vermont regulated effluent
discharges into Lake Champlain, which a paper company challenged as
preempted by the Federal Clean Water Act. 151 The Clean Water Act contained

143. Id. 27–28 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
144. Id. at 28–29.
145. Id. at 38.
146. The Court has used the terms “savings clause” and “saving clause” to describe such
provisions. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
plurality) (referring to a “saving clause”); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987)
(referring to a “savings clause”). For an additional discussion of saving(s) clauses, see Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009).
147. 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995).
148. Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 284 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994)).
149. Id. at 286.
150. 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).
151. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484.
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provisions that acted as a saving clause. The first provision provided that,
“[e]xcept as expressly provided[,] . . . nothing in this chapter shall . . . be
construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.” 152
The second provision stated, “Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief . . . .” 153 The Clean Water Act, notwithstanding the saving clause,
overrode Vermont’s law because allowing states affected by discharge to
regulate individually would impede federal objectives. 154 Casting aside the saving
clause, the Court stated, “[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine
this carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause . . . .” 155
Similarly, a saving clause failed to prevent federal law from eclipsing state
law in Gade. 156 In Gade, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
contained two saving clauses. Section 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act provided the
following:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law
with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of,
or in the course of, employment. 157
Additionally, section 18(a) of the OSH Act provided that no “State agency or
court [shall be prevented] from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect
under section 655 of this title.” 158 Despite the saving clause, the Court held that
the OSH Act preempted state laws establishing training for hazardous waste
workers. The Court explained, “Although this is a saving clause, not a preemption clause, the natural implication of this provision is that state laws
regulating the same issue as federal laws are not saved, even if they merely
supplement the federal standard.” 159
Other examples of when the Court concluded that saving clauses were
inadequate to salvage state law can be found in rulings discussing ERISA and
the Death on the High Seas Act. 160 In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the
Court held that an employee’s common law breach of contract and tort suit
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012).
153. Id. § 1365(e).
154. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493–94.
155. Id. at 494.
156. 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992).
157. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 4(b)(4), 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2012)).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
159. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992).
160. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that a state suit alleging
improper processing of claims for benefits was preempted by ERISA).
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against the insurance company that issued his insurance policy 161 was not
covered within the saving clause and thus was preempted by ERISA. 162 In
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, the Court interpreted a saving clause
narrowly as a jurisdictional saving clause, which did not preclude imposition of
federal substantive law to preempt conflicting state wrongful death statutes. 163
State law may also be preempted if the Court narrowly construes a saving
clause. 164 For example, in United States v. Locke, the Court interpreted a saving
clause in the Federal Oil Pollution Act to allow state regulation of “liability rules
and financial requirements relating to oil spills,” but not of a vessel’s conduct. 165
The Court reasoned, “We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where
doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal
law.” 166
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Court interpreted two
provisions in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act: an express
preemption clause and a saving clause. 167 The preemption provision prohibited
states from establishing “any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of” motor vehicles “which is not identical to the Federal
standard,” 168 while the saving clause expressed that compliance with federal law
“does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 169 The
Court declined to find that the saving clause immunized state tort claims beyond
the express preemption provision—leaving those claims vulnerable to conflict
preemption. 170
Therefore, regardless of whether the provision in the Public Health Service
Act is construed as an anti-preemption or a saving clause, it might be inadequate
to guard against nullification of state quarantine laws. Under either construction,
the provision will be interpreted narrowly, making state legislation susceptible to
field and conflict preemption.

161. Id. at 43.
162. Id. at 57.
163. 477 U.S. 207, 227 (1986) (holding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the
Death on the High Seas Act preempted a wrongful death suit over the deaths of offshore drilling
platform workers killed in a helicopter crash off of Louisiana’s coast).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105–07 (2000).
165. Id. at 105.
166. Id. at 106.
167. 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
168. Gier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994)).
169. Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994)).
170. Id. at 874; see also Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 329 (2011)
(explaining that the existence of a saving clause “makes clear that Congress intended state tort suits to
fall outside the scope of the express pre-emption clause”).
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IV. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
A.

Physical Impossibility

State Ebola quarantine regulations are least likely to be superseded through
conflict preemption that is based on a physical impossibility. Because this type of
preemption requires a showing that state and federal laws are mutually
exclusive, it is a rare form of preemption. 171 In fact, Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 172 the oft-cited case for preemption due to a physical
impossibility, actually illustrates when the requirements for this type of
preemption are not satisfied. In this case, avocado growers challenged a
California law measuring maturity of avocados by oil content as preempted by a
federal regulation, which provides for certification of avocado maturity without
reference to oil content. 173 Because growers could simply allow the avocados to
mature longer on the trees to meet California’s standard, it was not impossible
for growers to comply with California and federal standards. Consequently, the
Court upheld the state law. 174
In the Ebola situation, there is a strong argument against finding conflict
preemption based on a physical impossibility because state quarantine
regulations are not mutually exclusive of federal law. The state regulations
require asymptomatic persons who recently had contact with Ebola-infected
persons to submit to mandatory quarantine. In contrast, federal regulation is less
intrusive because it recommends mandatory monitoring of only a person’s
symptoms and movements. 175 States could argue that, like in Florida Lime, a
state can impose a higher standard for quarantine regulations and not conflict
with federal regulations because the state regulations are simply more expansive.
B.

Obstacle Preemption: Impeding a Federal Objective

Although the states’ Ebola quarantine regulations might survive a challenge
based on physical impossibility, state laws that complement federal law might
nevertheless be preempted on the basis of obstacle preemption. 176 In Locke, the
171. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 608 (2013) (“It will
rarely be ‘impossible’ to conform to both federal and state law . . . .”); Nelson, supra note 89, at 228
n.15 (noting the Court’s infrequent use of the physical impossibility test); Young, The Ordinary Diet of
the Law, supra note 93, at 289 (describing the impossibility doctrine as “little-used”).
172. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
173. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 132.
174. Id. at 142–43 (explaining that an impossibility would have existed if the federal law
prohibited picking avocados with more than seven percent oil and the California law required a
minimum of eight percent oil).
175. Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to
Stop the Spread of Ebola, supra note 22.
176. Professor Nelson criticizes the obstacle preemption doctrine as “misplaced” because “the
mere fact that federal law serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that it contradicts
everything that might get in the way of those purposes.” Nelson, supra note 89, at 231–32.
For examples of decisions upholding state laws against an obstacle preemption challenge, see
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009), in which the Court concluded that no obstacle preemption
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state of Washington responded to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 by
regulating oil tankers “regarding general navigation and watch procedures,
English language skills, training, and casualty reporting.” 177 Because of the
similarity of its laws to federal law, the state of Washington argued that federal
law did not preempt its regulation. 178 The Court disagreed:
It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of pre-emption to say that
state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements. . . . The
appropriate inquiry still remains whether the purposes and objectives
of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish a workable,
uniform system, are consistent with concurrent state regulation. 179
Additionally, in Hines v. Davidowitz, Pennsylvania had passed legislation
requiring aliens to carry their alien identification cards before Congress passed
the Alien Registration Act. 180 In deciding the validity of Pennsylvania’s Alien
Registration Act, the Court recognized congressional need for uniformity and
held that federal law preempted the state law, notwithstanding that the state law

existed because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not provide a federal remedy for unsafe drugs,
but rather relied on available state law remedies; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69, 82 (1987), in which the Court found that the state law was consistent with the purpose of the
Federal Williams Act, which regulated tender offers; Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985), in which the Court determined that local requirements
established for blood plasma collection by paid donors posed no interference with federal
maintenance of a sufficient blood supply; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984), in
which the Court perceived no conflict with the Price-Anderson Act or frustration of federal objectives
by allowing a state award of punitive damages; and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512 (1983), in
which the Court ruled that a strike replacement’s breach of contract claim against his employer did not
frustrate the objectives of federal labor laws.
For examples of state laws invalidated under obstacle preemption, see Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 477–78 (1984), in which
the Court held that a state law impeded the objectives of the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act;
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982), in which the Court determined that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act frustrated the objectives of the Federal Williams Act; Fidelity Federal Savings
& Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982), in which the Court concluded that a state’s
due-on-sale laws frustrated objectives of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s regulations by
depriving the lender of the flexibility the Board intended to afford; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,
234–35 (1981), in which the Court pointed out that the division of retired pay as community property
would disrupt the federal government’s management of military personnel and its encouragement of
orderly promotion and maintenance of youthful military; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 589–
90 (1979), in which the Court decided that allowing the division of expected retirement payments in
divorce proceedings would undermine the purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act; Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978), in which the Court found parts of a state law regulating oil
tankers preempted because those sections frustrated the congressional objective to have uniform
standards for tanker design; and Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 641, 656 (1971), in which the Court
held that because the Federal Bankruptcy Act governs discharges of judgments after bankruptcy, a
state law that allows for suspension of a driver’s license for unpaid motor vehicle-related judgments
previously discharged through bankruptcy conflicts with the Federal Act.
177. 529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000).
178. Locke, 529 U.S. at 115.
179. Id.
180. 312 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1941).
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complemented federal law. 181
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, Massachusetts restricted state
entities from purchasing goods and services from companies having a
commercial relationship with Burma. 182 Subsequently, Congress enacted
legislation imposing sanctions on Burma, authorizing the President to set
additional sanctions, and instructing the President to develop “a comprehensive,
multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices
and the quality of life in Burma.” 183 Although the state law did not directly
conflict with federal law and shared common goals with its federal counterpart,
the state law was preempted. 184 The Court explained,
The fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means, and
the fact that some companies may be able to comply with both sets of
sanctions does not mean that the state Act is not at odds with
achievement of the federal decision about the right degree of pressure
to employ. 185
In Crosby, by restraining the President’s flexibility and discretion, the state
law interfered with the President’s authority over economic sanctions against
Burma. 186 The Court reasoned,
The President has been given this authority not merely to make a
political statement but to achieve a political result, and the fullness of
his authority shows the importance in the congressional mind of
reaching that result. It is simply implausible that Congress would have
gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had been willing to
compromise his effectiveness by deference to every provision of state
statute or local ordinance that might, if enforced, blunt the
consequences of discretionary Presidential action. 187
Finally, the state law in Crosby “compromise[d] the very capacity of the
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments.” 188 The state law prompted several nations to directly protest the
United States and some nations to file formal complaints against the United
States with the World Trade Organization. 189 The Court deferred to the
executive branch in its assessment of how the state law complicated the
congressional goal for a comprehensive multilateral strategy and concluded that

181. Hines, 312 U.S. at 73 (“And whether or not registration of aliens is of such a nature that the
Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might
validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.”).
182. 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
183. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.
184. Id. at 379.
185. Id. at 379–80 (internal citation omitted).
186. Id. at 373–74.
187. Id. at 376.
188. Id. at 381.
189. Id. at 382–83.
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the state law impeded congressional diplomatic objectives. 190
1.

Uniformity

In the present case, the United States announced its four-point strategy in
combatting Ebola as “[c]ontrolling the epidemic; [m]anaging the secondary
consequences of the outbreak; [b]uilding coherent leadership and operations;
and, [e]nsuring global health security.” 191 State Ebola regulations could be
preempted for interfering with a federal need to establish uniformity, maintain
national security against the domestic spread of Ebola, and provide support to
contain Ebola abroad.
The need for uniformity is a central justification for preemption. 192 In
addition to the CDC, a public health emergency involves numerous federal
agencies and departments, including the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Transportation, Customs and Border Protection, the Food and
Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of
Defense. 193 The multitude and many levels of government—over 87,500 local
governmental units in the United States—make uniformity essential in federal
governance. 194
This multiplicity of government actors below the federal level virtually
ensures that, in the absence of federal preemption, businesses with
national operations that serve national markets will be subject to

190. Id. at 385–86. Professor Young criticizes the Court’s premature preemption holding in
Crosby because it allowed the “mere delegation of authority to the President to preempt state trade
sanctions [to] signal[] that such sanctions were in conflict with federal policy, even though the
President had not actually exercised his preemptive authority.” Ernst A. Young, Executive
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 899–900 (2008). He finds Crosby troubling because “[t]o say that
the mere delegation of authority to act can have preemptive effect, without requiring a political
decision to act for which the Executive may be held accountable, is to disembowel the notion of
process federalism entirely.” Id. at 900.
191. The U.S. Response to the Ebola Outbreak: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
113th Cong. (Nov. 12, 2014) (statement of Heather Higginbottom, Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources), http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2014/233996.htm [hereinafter
Statement of Heather Higginbottom]. The strategy has also been phrased as designed “[t]o control the
outbreak; [t]o address the ripple effects on local economies and communities to prevent massive
humanitarian disasters; [t]o coordinate a broader global response; and [t]o urgently build up public
health systems in countries with few resources.” U.S. Deploying 3000 Troops to West Africa in
Intensified Response? To Fight Ebola, RTTNEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:29 AM),
http://www.rttnews.com/2384986/us-deploying-3000-troops-to-west-africa-in-intensified-response-tofight-ebola.aspx.
192. See Davis, supra note 77, at 1016 (“The perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and
has always been, a critical factor to the Court in evaluating whether a state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of federal objectives.”); Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 782 (discussing the need for
uniformity as a compelling justification for preemption).
193. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, supra note 20, at 5. For a detailed account of
the involvement of various agencies in containing Ebola, see Memorandum from the Majority Staff,
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, supra note 24, at
4–8.
194. Untereiner, supra note 117, at 1261–62.
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complicated, overlapping, and sometimes even conflicting legal
regimes. These overlapping regulations have the potential to impose
onerous burdens on interstate commerce and to disrupt and undermine
federal regulatory programs. 195
Uniformity provides predictability and efficiency for those being regulated,
as well as for the regulators. For example, for ERISA, uniformity provides “a set
standard” by which claims and disbursements may be processed. 196 “A
patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in
benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans
to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting
them.” 197 For occupational health and safety issues, Congress intended that
employers and employees be subject to only one set of regulations, be it state or
federal. 198 In Ouellette, the Court pointed out that predictability and efficiency in
the EPA’s permit system would have been impaired by the affected state passing
their own regulations, which would lead to a “chaotic confrontation between
sovereign states.” 199
For state Ebola quarantine regulations, uniformity would ensure many
benefits. “As far back as 1851 the lack of a uniform system of quarantine laws
was keenly felt.” 200 Reacting to a cholera epidemic in 1892, New York assembled
investigators to study New York’s quarantine. 201 These investigators articulated
the following reasons in support of a uniform federal quarantine system:
1. As the federal government is an indispensable factor in every
quarantine crisis, it is only by giving to the federal government
complete control that conflicts of authority and the weakening effects
of official jealousy can be avoided.
2. The federal government has at command the trained men who have
to be summoned to the help of the state in time of peril. It is better to
have the federal government directly instead of indirectly responsible.
3. The federal government in every crisis, through the various arms of
the public service, is able to command an amount of expert

195. Id.
196. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
197. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
198. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992).
199. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)). With regards to legislation that takes into account federalism
concerns, Professor Patricia Donze states that “[e]nvironmental and labor groups ‘fear the measures
[federalism bills] would undermine federal agencies’ authority to enforce nationwide regulations and
standards, setting back the clock on hard-won health and environmental protections.’” Donze, supra
note 77, at 241 (quoting Ron Eckstein, Federalism Bills Unify Usual Foes, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999,
at 1).
200. E. H. Lewinski-Corwin, Quarantine in the Maritime Cities of the United States, 60 J. AM.
MEDIC. ASS’N 194, 195 (1913).
201. Id.
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cooperation entirely beyond the reach of a state. 202
As to the first justification articulated above, recent events illustrate the
potential for conflicting authority—not only between the federal and state
governments, but also among individual states. Governor Christie released Kaci
Hickox from her mandatory quarantine, which she spent in a tent on hospital
grounds in New Jersey. 203 When she was released to return to her home in
Maine, she was placed under quarantine in her home. 204 Public health experts
have cautioned that multiple quarantine policies among the states could confuse
the public and healthcare workers, as well as lead to inconsistencies that
negatively impact disease control. 205 “Furthermore, governors and other elected
officials who intercede in technical public health matters undermine public
confidence in the CDC and state public health agencies.” 206 Consequently, the
need to reconcile the conflict between the federal and state governments over
the allocation of authority over public health has led some policy experts to
recommend “federalizing the rules for pandemic response, much as the
recognition of the far-reaching and adverse effects of pollution led to federal
environmental legislation.” 207
As to the second and third justifications, the federal government indeed has
trained persons who can provide the necessary expertise to combat Ebola. When
nurse Nina Pham contracted Ebola through her care for Thomas Eric Duncan,
she was later moved to the National Institutes of Health’s hospital, a state of the
art facility, 208 where she was under the medical supervision of the nation’s

202. Id. The investigators also noted that foreign consuls would be more likely to cooperate
with federal quarantine officials, and that “recent experiences” indicated a trend toward “international
supervision of infectious diseases.” Id.
203. Gostin & Friedman, supra note 37; Prince, supra note 36.
204. Julia Bayly, Shayna Jacobs & Corky Siemaszko, Nurse Kaci Hickox Vows to Break New
Ebola Quarantine Protocol in Maine, Take Issue to Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2014, 7:25 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/kaci-hickox-remains-defiant-won-follow-maine-ebolaquarantine-article-1.1991074.
205. CARAFANO ET AL., supra note 7, at 21 (“State leaders exacerbated the problem by
providing conflicting guidance. For example, the governors of New York and New Jersey issued
quarantine orders, but others did not, leading to confusion about quarantine rules and standards.”);
Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3; Bidgood & Zernike, supra note 17 (“In response, governors of both
parties are struggling to define public health policies on the virus, leaving a confusing patchwork of
rules regarding monitoring, restricting and quarantining health care workers who have treated Ebola
patients, whether domestically or abroad.”).
206. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, supra note 20, at 5; Rothstein, From SARS to
Ebola, supra note 9, at 256 (stating that “[o]ther important reasons for questioning these ad hoc state
policies include possibly undermining the CDC’s credibility and confusing the public by having
different quarantine policies in each state.”).
207. STANLEY M. LEMON, MARAGRET A. HAMBURG, P. FREDERICK SPARLING, EILEEN R.
CHOFFNES & ALISON MACK, ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC
DISEASE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 18–19 (2007) (citing Vitoria Sutton, Director of the Center for
Bioterrorism, Law, and Public Policy at Texas Tech University, and Shelley Hearne of Johns Hopkins
University).
208. Nina Pham Moving from Texas for Ebola Treatment, CBS (Oct. 16, 2014, 10:43 AM),
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2014/10/16/nina-pham-moving-from-texas-for-ebola-treatment/; Press Release,
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experts who later cured her. 209 Additionally, the federal government’s expertise
makes it better equipped and informed to formulate national guidelines for
fighting Ebola. The CDC guidelines, which do not include mandatory
quarantining of asymptomatic persons, 210 have been described as “sensible, . . .
based on science . . . [and] crafted in consultation with the people who are
actually going there [to Africa] to do the work.” 211 Thus, for the reasons
articulated by the New York Assembly, the federal government could desire
uniform standards for Ebola quarantine regulations, and therefore state
quarantine laws could be preempted for thwarting national uniformity.
2.

National Security and Global Response to Contain Ebola

In addition to the need for uniformity, state Ebola quarantines could
interfere with other federal objectives—particularly the President’s plan to fight
Ebola. The United States has taken the lead in initiating a global response
against Ebola, 212 and President Obama has prioritized Ebola as a national
security concern, 213 as evidenced by his announcement: “We have to work
together at every level—federal, state and local. And we have to keep leading
the global response, because the best way to stop this disease, the best way to
keep Americans safe, is to stop it at its source—in West Africa.” 214
State-mandated quarantines could interfere with the United States’ national
security and global response in a number of ways. First, national security would
be compromised if Ebola spreads. 215 Mandatory quarantines risk deterring
others from reporting symptoms or information about their recent contact with

Nat’l Insts. of Health, Texas Nurse Free of Ebola Virus; Discharged from NIH Clinical Center (Oct.
24, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/oct2014/od-24a.htm.
209. Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 208.
210. Factsheet on Updated CDC Guidance: Monitoring Symptoms and Controlling Movement to
Stop the Spread of Ebola, supra note 22.
211. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on American Health Care Workers
Fighting Ebola (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/29/remarkspresident-american-health-care-workers-fighting-ebola [hereinafter Statement of President Obama].
212. Statement of Heather Higginbottom, supra note 191 (“The U.S. has taken a lead role in
managing the global response in Liberia. We are working with the UK and France as they assume
larger roles in Sierra Leone and Guinea, respectively.”).
213. Rose Gottemoeller, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Security, Remarks at
University of Virginia, Jefferson Literary and Debating Society: Biosecurity in the Time of Ebola
(Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.state.gov/t/us/2015/237560.htm (“President Obama has made it clear that
‘fighting this [Ebola] epidemic is a national security priority for the United States’ and that world
leaders needed to increase efforts to counter a wide range of biological threats, ‘from infections that
are resistant to antibiotics to terrorists that seek to develop and use biological weapons.’”).
214. President Obama Provides an Update on the U.S.-Led Response to Ebola, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ebola-response (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (quoting President Barack
Obama and providing an overview of the Obama administration’s “global response” and coordinating
domestic efforts against Ebola).
215. Statement of Heather Higginbottom, supra note 191 (“As President Obama said, ‘If we
don’t make that effort now, and this spreads not just through Africa but other parts of the world[,] . . .
it could be a serious danger to the United States.’” (omission in original)).
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someone infected with Ebola. 216 If such persons fail to report this information,
their conditions would not be monitored, and they risk infecting others.
Moreover, mandatory quarantines could lead to the negative unintended
consequence of spreading the disease in yet another way.
Another risk associated with quarantine is the unintended impact on
patients admitted to the hospital for other medical problems. Patients
with acute coronary syndromes, strokes, cancer, and traumatic injuries
were all subjected to confinement. In addition, the perceived benefit of
confining medical personnel to the hospital did not guarantee that
patients would be provided with timely and quality medical care.
In the case of SARS, patients with multiple diagnoses were cross
contaminated within the crowded hospital, adding to their health risks.
In the case of Ebola, patients with malaria and dengue fever may be
confined with Ebola patients. Given the risk, the benefit of this
strategy may not outweigh the health risk to the large number of
individuals affected. 217
Second, because the individuals who have recently traveled to an Ebolainfected country are predominantly healthcare workers, 218 state-mandated
quarantines risk stigmatizing them. 219 The scientific community agrees that the
twenty-one-day quarantine is not grounded in science and could stymie efforts to
stop Ebola at its source. 220 Researchers conclude that “[a]symptomatic persons
do not spread Ebola, therefore such actions are not scientifically supported.” 221
The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology in America and the Infectious
Diseases Society of America, “two authoritative bodies within the United
States,” oppose mandatory quarantine of asymptomatic health workers and are
concerned that “[t]his approach carries unintended negative consequences
without significant additional benefits.” 222 The CDC’s more flexible Ebola
quarantine policies have also garnered support from the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists, which “represent[s] the nation’s ‘disease detectives’

216. McKay et al., supra note 22 (reporting CDC Director’s concern about healthcare workers’
concealment of prior contact with Ebola patients due to fear of quarantines).
217. See Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 8.
218. Statement of President Obama, supra note 211 (“Keep in mind that of the seven
Americans treated for Ebola so far, most of them while serving in West Africa, all seven have
survived.”).
219. CSTE Urges States to Heed CDC’s Ebola Quarantine Guidance, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28,
2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cste-urges-states-to-heed-cdcs-ebola-quarantineguidance-280674052.html (“Recent decisions by governors to enforce quarantines on health
professionals and other individuals returning from Ebola-affected countries in West Africa are not
rooted in science and provide a serious disincentive for health professionals to fight this disease at its
source.”).
220. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029
(2014).
221. E.g., Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3.
222. Id. (quoting IDSA Statement on Involuntary Quarantine of Healthcare Workers Returning
from Ebola-Affected Countries, IDSA, http://www.idsociety.org/2014_ebola_quarantine/#sthash.
NPEyXnPE.dpuf (last visited by Barbisch et al. Nov. 8, 2014)).
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working on the frontlines to stop Ebola.” 223
Third, the stigma could, in turn, discourage health workers from returning
to Africa to provide additional aid and new volunteers from traveling to Africa
as part of the relief effort. 224 Researchers conclude, “Hundreds of years of
experience show that to stop an epidemic of this type requires controlling it at its
225
source.” In order to stop Ebola at its source, organizations such as Médecins
sans Frontières, the World Health Organization, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development have estimated that “tens of thousands of additional
volunteers” are needed, 226 and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim estimated
that as many as 5,000 health workers are needed, a need that has largely gone
unmet. 227 To make matters worse, beside the heightened need for health
workers, health workers have suffered the greatest casualties, with as many as
443 infected cases and 244 deaths among health workers. 228
The decisions by the states, White House officials and others warned,
could hamstring the effort to staff up to 17 Ebola treatment units that
American military personnel are building in Liberia. American health
officials had already been facing the difficult task of finding volunteers,
and have accepted help from foreign nationals, including Cuba, to aid
the effort. 229
President Obama expressed his concerns:
[W]e have to keep in mind that if we’re discouraging our health care
workers, who are prepared to make these sacrifices, from traveling to
these places in need, then we’re not doing our job in terms of looking
after our own public health and safety. What we are—what we need
right now is these shock troops who are out there leading globally. We
can’t discourage that; we’ve got to encourage it and applaud it. 230
A report shows that “[m]isapplication of quarantine guidelines to asymptomatic
individuals resulted in fewer volunteers deploying to support the Ebola outbreak

223. CSTE Urges States to Heed CDC’s Ebola Quarantine Guidance, supra note 219.
224. Statement of President Obama, supra note 211. The media, such as CNN, have also
reported the Executive’s concerns with state quarantines:
After visiting a group of health care workers who’d recently returned from the epicenter of
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa—some still within the virus’s 21-day incubation period,
but showing no symptoms—Obama said policies like states requiring three-week
quarantines of doctors and nurses who treated Ebola patients could harm U.S. efforts to stop
its spread.
Eric Bradner, Obama Hits Governors for ‘Hiding Under the Covers’ from Ebola, CNN POLITICS (Oct.
29, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/politics/obama-ebola-hiding/index.html.
225. E.g., Drazen et al., supra note 220, at 2029.
226. Id.
227. Lauren Vogel, Call for Ebola Medics Falls on Deaf Ears: MSF, 186 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N
J. E669, E669 (2014).
228. Id.
229. Flegenheimer et al., supra note 15.
230. Statement of President Obama, supra note 211.

2015]

UNDER CONTAINMENT

33

owing to concerns about restrictions upon their return.” 231 For example, Ryan
Boyko, a student at the Yale University School of Public Health, was
quarantined by order of Connecticut’s Governor upon returning from West
Africa as a healthcare volunteer, and commented that such quarantines would
discourage health workers from volunteering. 232 Beyond discouraging
volunteers, the states’ quarantine policies disable health workers because “[i]f
everyone who cares for an Ebola patient must be quarantined for a long period
of time, we may run out of new workers.” 233 Because there is currently no
vaccine for Ebola, the only means of stopping the spread of Ebola is through the
provision of health services to the affected, which relies more than ever on the
availability of health workers. 234 Therefore, although states might defend their
Ebola quarantine regulations as supplementing federal regulations, state law
could still be preempted for frustrating federal objectives.
V.
A.

FIELD PREEMPTION

Pervasive Federal Scheme

Even if state Ebola quarantine regulations were to survive a challenge
based on obstacle preemption, they could be preempted through field
preemption. States could argue that their quarantine laws are harmonious with
federal regulations. But this argument is of no avail when the inquiry concerns
field preemption because the Court has consistently construed the field
preemption doctrine to override state laws that “‘curtail or complement’ federal
law or . . . ‘enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.’” 235 The Court has
unequivocally prohibited states from “enter[ing], in any respect, an area the
Federal Government has reserved for itself.” 236

231. Barbisch et al., supra note 42, at 3 (citing Christie Duffy, Ebola Volunteers Down After
Quarantine Rules Imposed, NJTV NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.njtvonline.org/news/video/
groups-blame-ebola-quarantine-for-fewer-volunteers/).
232. Lips, supra note 16.
233. Id. (quoting Zita Lazzarini, University of Connecticut professor).
234. See Casey, supra note 1, at 24. Several vaccines have been developed but are still in the
investigational phase. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, supra note 24, at 3; Press Release, Office of the White
House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Update on the Ebola Response (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/02/fact-sheet-update-ebola-response [hereinafter
White House Press Release on the Ebola Response].
235. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 66–67 (1940)); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984).
236. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. For an additional example of field preemption invalidating
state law, see Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), in which the Court held that the Federal
Gas Act occupied the field of “wholesale sales of natural gas in interstate commerce.” 462 U.S. 176,
184 (1983).
For examples of circumstances where the Court has upheld state law against a field preemption
challenge, see California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), in which the
Court found that state law employment practices favoring pregnant women were not preempted by
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
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Arizona v. United States provides the most current example of both species
of field preemption. 237 Arizona passed an immigration bill, Arizona Senate Bill
1070, which criminalized noncompliance with federal alien-registration
requirements 238 and the seeking of employment by unauthorized aliens. 239 It
authorized police officers to arrest anyone, without a warrant but with probable
cause, believed to be removable 240 and required officers to verify an arrestee’s
immigration status with the federal government. 241 The Court concluded that the
“extensive[ness] and complex[ity]” 242 of federal legislation governing
immigration carved out immigration law as federal domain. 243 Congress’s
dominancy was made clear by its passage of a vast array of immigration
legislation, defining lawful entry and federal crimes, 244 registration
requirements, 245 public benefits, 246 and sanctions on employers. 247 Congress’s
authority to make uniform laws for naturalization, as conferred by Article I,
Section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution, further buttressed congressional
governance over immigration. 248
Of course, whether the federal government successfully exerts field
preemption depends on how narrowly or broadly the field is defined. 249 Looking
broadly, the Court in Arizona defined the field as encompassing “immigration

238, 239 (1984), in which the Court concluded that the Price-Anderson Act did not preempt a state
court’s award of punitive damages for a laboratory analyst’s injuries resulting from plutonium
contamination; Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54,
468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984), in which the Court stated that the National Labor Relations Act neither
contained any indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of labor-management
relations nor preempted state regulation of union officials’ qualifications; Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984), in which the
Court found that the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act did not preempt state laws also regulating
agricultural product marketing.
237. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
238. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2010), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012).
239. Id. § 13-2928, invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
240. Id. § 13-3883(A)(5), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
241. Id. § 11-1051, invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
242. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
243. Id. at 2501–02.
244. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (2012).
245. See id. §§ 1301–1306.
246. See id. § 1622.
247. See id. § 1324(a).
248. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
249. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (defining ERISA’s
preemption provision narrowly to encompass only state laws relating to employee benefit plans, rather
than simply benefits, and consequently upholding state severance pay law); Young, The Ordinary Diet
of the Law, supra note 93, at 336 (“In most cases, the relevant ‘field’ can be characterized in multiple
ways.”).
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and alien status” 250 and concluded that Congress intended to occupy this field. 251
Even when it focused on each of the contested provisions of Arizona’s
legislation, narrowing the field from “immigration” to “alien registration,” the
Court nonetheless found field preemption. 252
In the present case, states have a greater likelihood of successfully
defending their Ebola quarantine regulations against the type of field
preemption that is based on a pervasive federal scheme. Defined narrowly, the
Public Health Service Act can be construed as regulating the field of quarantine,
which is unlikely to satisfy the Court’s definition of a pervasive scheme. Even
construing the Federal Public Health Service Act broadly as regulating
communicable diseases, the Act does not have nearly the same breadth as
federal immigration legislation.
The federal government might argue that the CDC regulations controlling
communicable diseases are comprehensive and demonstrate a pervasive federal
scheme. But that argument would be ineffective because the Court looks to the
pervasiveness of the federal legislation—not the comprehensiveness of the
federal regulation—to identify field preemption. 253 In Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., the Court explicitly “reject[ed] the
argument that an intent to pre-empt [could] be inferred from the
comprehensiveness of the FDA’s regulations.” 254 As the Court explained,
We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the
comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensiveness of
statutes. As a result of their specialized functions, agencies normally
deal with problems in far more detail than does Congress. To infer preemption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is
virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides
to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive. 255
Therefore, unless an agency is explicit about whether its regulation has
preemptive effect, the Court will “pause before” concluding that “the mere
volume and complexity of [an agency’s] regulations indicate that the agency did
in fact intend to pre-empt.” 256 A subject matter’s complexity will necessarily
entail a comprehensive federal scheme and, therefore, cannot be the sole
indicator of congressional intent to exclude state laws: “Given the complexity of

250. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. Whether immigration is an exclusively federal field is debated.
Some scholars point out that there is not an express grant of authority to Congress over immigration.
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 171, at 611.
251. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
252. Id. at 2502–03.
253. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1973)
(relying on a provision in section 1108(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a), that
declared “[t]he United States of America . . . possess[es] and exercise[s] complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States . . . ." to find preemption regarding aircraft
noise).
254. 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).
255. Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 718.
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the matter addressed by Congress . . . , a detailed statutory scheme was both
likely and appropriate, completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive
intent.” 257 Consequently, state Ebola quarantine regulations are likely protected
against the type of field preemption that is based on a pervasive federal scheme.
B.

Dominant Federal Interest

Although state Ebola quarantine regulations might withstand an attack
based on a claim of a pervasive federal scheme, they are unlikely to do so under
a field preemption attack grounded on a dominant federal interest. At first
blush, it appears the states would have a strong argument to defend against a
claim of a dominant federal interest in quarantine regulation. In Hillsborough
County, the Court declined to find that the Public Health Service Act preempted
a local ordinance regulating the collection of blood plasma from paid donors
simply because of a federal interest. 258 In that instance, the Court discounted the
significance of a dominant federal interest:
Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by
definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however,
that every federal statute ousts all related state law. Neither does the
Supremacy Clause require us to rank congressional enactments in
order of “importance” and hold that, for those at the top of the scale,
federal regulation must be exclusive. 259
Hillsborough County, however, is not analogous because it lacked an element of
foreign affairs that is present in the current situation, which would make state
Ebola regulations vulnerable.
The area of foreign affairs is uniquely situated among the fields that enjoy
exclusive federal control. The Court has given great deference to federal
prerogatives in foreign affairs, announcing that “[o]ur system of government is
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of
the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.” 260
One of the strongest pronouncements of federal foreign affairs powers
appears in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 261 In that case, Congress
authorized President Franklin Roosevelt to issue an arms embargo on countries
involved in the Chaco conflict, 262 which was challenged as an invalid delegation
of power to the executive branch. 263 Curtiss-Wright delineated the scope of
foreign affairs as resting exclusively within the federal sphere, tracing the
transmission of that power from Great Britain to the national government when

257. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359–60 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973)).
258. 471 U.S. at 719.
259. Id.
260. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
261. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
262. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 312.
263. Id. at 314.
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the colonies ceded from the Crown. 264 As a result, the Court explains, the
individual states never possessed international powers. 265 Moreover, the power
to negotiate with foreign countries lies solely with the President:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. . . . “The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations.” 266
Although Curtiss-Wright did not involve preemption, subsequent
preemption cases have recognized the President’s plenary power in foreign
affairs as a foundation for preempting state law. 267 In Zschernig v. Miller,
Oregon’s probate law concerning nonresident aliens’ claim to personal or real
property was preempted because it intruded upon federal prerogatives in foreign
policy. 268 Specifically, the state law conditioned inheritance by a nonresident
alien upon a showing that his home country would not confiscate the property
and would provide reciprocal rights of inheritance for Americans. 269 The Court
held that “state action with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is
preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the

264. Id. at 316–17.
265. Id. at 316.
266. Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall)).
267. One criticism that can be lodged against preemption predicated on federal dominance in
foreign affairs is that globalization increases the interconnectivity of foreign and domestic activities,
making it difficult to distinguish between the two. Professor Goldsmith points out,
As the world becomes more interconnected—as international law increasingly regulates
traditional “local” issues, as the category of “foreign affairs” expands to include traditional
domestic “concerns,” as local activities increasingly have foreign effects, and as state and
local governments increasingly participate on the foreign stage in response to the growing
influence of external activities on local communities—this overlap in the canons will only
grow.
Goldsmith, supra note 93, at 196 (footnote omitted); see also, Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism,
Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 141 (2001)
(“[I]t is no longer possible in an age of globalization to draw a bright line between ‘foreign’ and
‘domestic’ affairs.”). Professor Goldsmith provides several examples where a matter concerning
foreign affairs can be framed as an intrusion into state traditional police power: Angel Breard’s
execution, rather than viewing it as implicating an alien’s rights, was essentially an exercise of state
police power over criminal punishment for murder; the dispute over unpaid New York parking tickets
by foreign diplomats involved the state’s power over traffic violations, rather than diplomatic
immunity; and California’s method of calculating corporate franchise tax based on a worldwide
combined reporting was a state tax issue, rather than foreign commerce. Goldsmith, supra note 93, at
196–97 (first citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); then citing Clifford J. Levy, Giuilani May
Again Trim Diplomatic Parking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/
1997/04/20/nyregion/giuliani-may-again-trim-diplomats-parking.html; and then citing Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)); see also Young, The Ordinary Diet of the Law, supra
note 93, at 337 (discussing the problem of overlap between traditional state regulation and federal
regulation).
268. 389 U.S. 429, 439–41 (1968).
269. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31.
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state law, and hence without any showing of conflict.” 270 Thereby, the Court
conceived of the President’s “dormant foreign affairs power.” 271
In Arizona, the Court was sensitive to the potential effects of Arizona’s law
on foreign policy, noting, “It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned
about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must
be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign,
not the 50 separate States.” 272 The Court recognized the federal government’s
“inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign
nations,” 273 recounting the Framers’ support of federal power for fear that
“‘bordering States . . . under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense
of apparent interest or injury’ might take action that would undermine foreign
relations.” 274
Also, the Court in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi relied on the
foreign affairs power and a dominant federal interest to preempt state law. 275 In
that case, California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act required insurers
to disclose information regarding policies sold in Europe from 1920 to 1945. 276
The federal government, having established a system for Holocaust-era
insurance claims to be processed by the German Foundation in conjunction with
the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, 277 grew
concerned over the impact of California’s law on the federally negotiated
system. 278 The Court concluded that the state law undermined the President’s
discretion to use “economic pressure” as a “tool of diplomacy.” 279 The Court
reiterated the federal government’s prerogative over foreign affairs:
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National
Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the National
Government in the first place. 280
The Court declared, “Although the source of the President’s power to act in
270. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418 (2003).
271. Chemerinsky, supra note 63, at 1323.
272. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (“One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to
do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in
another country.” (emphasis added)).
273. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
274. Id. (omission in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 2003)).
275. 539 U.S. 396, 420–23 (2003).
276. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408–10.
277. Id. at 406–07.
278. Id. at 411–12 (discussing statements that California’s actions “have already threatened to
damage the cooperative spirit which the [ICHEIC] requires to resolve the important issue for
Holocaust survivors”).
279. Id. at 423–24.
280. Id. at 413.
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foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign
relations.’” 281 Additionally, the Court recognized presidential power to make
executive agreements with foreign countries, which are effective without
congressional approval. 282 The Court pointed out that had the President issued
an executive agreement that expressly preempted state regulation in Garamendi,
the Court would have straightforwardly applied the general recognition that
executive agreements can preempt state law. 283 Due to the lack of an express
preemption provision, the Court relied on interference with foreign affairs as a
basis for invoking field preemption to invalidate California’s law. 284
Moreover, even areas of state traditional police powers may implicate
foreign affairs and be susceptible to preemption through a dominant federal
interest. In McCarty v. McCarty, a federal interest prevailed over the state’s
traditional prerogatives in family law. 285 In that case, the state community
property law allowed for military retired pay to be divided in a divorce
proceeding. The Court identified a federal interest in maintaining a “youthful
and vigorous” military to preclude application of the state’s community property
law. 286 The federal interest dominated in McCarty because federal authority to
maintain a military force is grounded in the Constitution’s grant to Congress 287
“[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces.” 288

281. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)). The Vesting Clause in Article II provides that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1,
while Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States,” id. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have challenged
arguments, premised on historical and textual grounds, that the Article II Vesting Clause implicitly
grants the President broad residual powers, particularly in foreign affairs. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). On the
other hand, some theorize that the textual differences between the two articles support an inference
that the President maintains broad residual powers beyond those stated in Article II. See id. at 546–49
(recounting the scholars who support the Vesting Clause Thesis). See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash
& Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001)
(discussing the source and allocation of foreign affairs power).
282. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 657 (1981) (“[T]here
has . . . been a longstanding practice of settling . . . claims [of its nationals against foreign countries] by
executive agreement without the advice and consent of the Senate, and this practice continues at the
present time.”).
283. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17 (“Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to
preempt state law, just as treaties are, and if the agreements here had expressly preempted laws like
[California’s] HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.” (footnote omitted)).
284. Id. at 417.
285. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
286. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234–35.
287. Id. at 232.
288. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14.
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Similarly, in United States v. Locke, the Court concluded that the Federal
Oil Pollution Act preempted Washington’s law regulating oil tankers. 289
Arguably, the state of Washington’s regulations were within its traditional police
powers to regulate health and safety, as the regulations endeavored to prevent
oil spills by providing “the best achievable protection . . . from damages caused
by the discharge of oil.” 290 Rather than focusing on state police powers, the
Court construed the state of Washington’s regulations as interfering with
traditional federal powers—interstate navigation and maritime trade. 291
The above cases demonstrate that “the President possesses extraordinary
powers to preempt state law affecting foreign relations on his own constitutional
authority and his authority delegated by Congress.” 292 In the present situation,
the President could assert his foreign affairs powers to preempt state Ebola
quarantine regulations because they arguably impair U.S. efforts to provide
support to Africa. As previously discussed, the United States has led the fight
against Ebola overseas by deploying nearly 3,000 service members to West
Africa 293 and committing $350 million, with an additional request from the
Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development for
$2.89 billion from Congress. 294 The effect state regulations could have on our
domestic and international response to Ebola makes it a dominant federal
interest. President Obama made the following statement in his address about
fighting Ebola: “I said this at the U.N. General Assembly—when disease or
disaster strikes anywhere in the world, the world calls us. And the reason they
call us is because of the men and women like the ones who are here today
[referring to Ebola healthcare workers].” 295 The United States’ leadership role in
the fight against Ebola is evident from the White House’s report that it
“[g]alvaniz[ed] international support for the response, which has resulted in
more than $2 billion in commitments since mid-September.” 296 State quarantine
regulations could compromise the United States’ position in the international
community and its diplomatic relations. If the United States is unable to rally
289. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
290. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97 (citing WASH. REV. CODE. § 88.46.040(3) (1994)).
291. The Court explained,
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has
been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established. The authority
of Congress to regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of
the separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist
Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution.
Id. at 99.
292. Goldsmith, supra note 93, at 191.
293. White House Press Release on the Ebola Response, supra note 234.
294. Statement of Heather Higginbottom, supra note 191. For a detailed account of the funds
allocated for the U.S. Ebola response, see House Appropriations Comm., Federal Ebola Response:
Preventing
and
Battling
Ebola
on
American
Soil,
HOUSE
REPUBLICANS,
http://www.gop.gov/app/uploads/2014/10/Appropriations-Committee-Federal-Ebola-Response.pdf
(last updated Oct. 8, 2014).
295. Statement of President Obama, supra note 211.
296. White House Press Release on the Ebola Response, supra note 234.
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health workers to volunteer for fear of being quarantined, how can the United
States call upon other nations to join the fight against Ebola? Because we lead,
and are depended upon by other nations to lead, state Ebola regulations could
be voided through field preemption.
Thus far, this Article has argued that an anti-preemption clause, standing
alone, is insufficient to immunize state Ebola regulations. And it has argued that
the foreign affairs power can preempt state legislation, even when facing state
traditional police powers. The final question that remains is which law prevails
when an anti-preemption clause or saving clause collides with executive foreign
affairs policy? Garamendi provides a clue as to what the answer might be.
In Garamendi, California argued that despite its interference with the
Executive’s foreign relations, its law was authorized under the McCarranFerguson Act’s anti-preemption clause. 297 The Court interpreted the McCarranFerguson Act as Congress’s self-imposed limitation of its commerce power to
allow states to regulate insurance within their borders, but it was not necessarily
a limit on executive foreign affairs powers: “[A] federal statute directed to
implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be
construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs.” 298
Therefore, the President’s assertion of the foreign affairs power could overcome
the anti-preemption provision in the Public Health Service Act and invalidate
state Ebola quarantine regulations.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is not to take a position regarding the
implementation of quarantines. But if quarantines are ineffective, then the
federal government will want to override state quarantine laws. Public health
experts have argued against Ebola quarantines because asymptomatic persons
are not contagious. If state quarantines should be superseded, one mechanism to
achieve that would be through preemption.
Ordinarily, state laws over health and safety enjoy a presumption against
preemption, but the Court has not hesitated to set aside state law when it
interferes with or conflicts with federal law or prerogatives. For the same reason,
the anti-preemption clause in section 264 of the Public Health Service Act
cannot shield state quarantine laws from preemption when there is a conflict
with federal law.
Since neither the presumption against preemption nor state police powers
are sufficient barriers against preemption, the federal government could employ
obstacle and field preemption to override state quarantine regulations, arguing
that they frustrate federal objectives and there is a dominant federal interest in
containing Ebola. State regulations impede the establishment of uniformity for
quarantine regulations, which is essential to the containment of any disease,
because multiple regulations can cause confusion and inconsistent responses.

297.
298.

Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003).
Id. at 428.
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Imposing a mandatory quarantine on asymptomatic persons who are not
contagious deters healthcare workers from volunteering and disables healthcare
workers who are under quarantine. The result is that fewer healthcare workers
are available to provide aid in West Africa and to prevent the epidemic from
spreading to the United States, which in turn threatens national security. State
quarantine regulations interfere with the President’s foreign affairs prerogative
and commitment to aid West Africa. Preempting state law could protect the lives
of those in Ebola-affected countries by removing state laws that stigmatize
healthcare workers and discourage them from participating in the battle against
Ebola. Thus, the containment of state Ebola quarantine regulations could
contribute to the containment of Ebola worldwide.

